RE-IMAGINE GHANA
Ghana’s Plan to Begin the Process of Cleaning Up its Zombies
An In-Depth Analysis of the Constitutional Review Committee’s Recommendations
~ Dr. H Aku Kwapong

Every so often, you stumble upon a government document that makes you rub your eyes and check if you’re still in the same universe. A document so shockingly sensible, so grounded in basic economic and political reality, that it feels like a dispatch from an alternate timeline where evidence and logic actually matter. That’s the feeling I got reading the final recommendations of Ghana’s Constitutional Review Committee (CRC), presented to President Mahama.
Here’s the thing about constitutions that most people don’t appreciate: they are, at their core, the immutable part of the architecture of a country’s social organization. And like any architectural rulebook, ambiguity is the enemy. When the rules governing who holds power, how money is spent, and who is accountable to whom are vague, contested, or riddled with loopholes, you don’t get flexibility – you get exploitation. You get a system where the powerful interpret ambiguity in their favor, every single time. What Ghana’s CRC has produced is nothing less than a blueprint for taking the ambiguity out of the nation’s social organization – a serious, methodical effort to architect a better foundation upon which a functioning democracy and economy can actually be built.
This is a significant step, and I don’t use that phrase lightly. For decades, Ghana has operated under a constitutional framework that left too much to discretion, too much to “convention,” too much to the goodwill of those in power. The result has been predictable: executive overreach, legislative capture, fiscal chaos, and a patronage system that treats public resources as private spoils. The CRC report represents a decisive break from that tradition of constructive ambiguity. It says, in effect: let’s stop pretending that vague rules and gentleman’s agreements will constrain politicians. Let’s write down exactly what is permitted, what is forbidden, and what happens when someone crosses the line.
Let’s be clear: the world is full of well-meaning reports that gather dust on shelves. But the Ghanaian CRC report is different. It’s not just a list of suggestions; it’s a devastatingly precise autopsy of a political economy captured by what I call “zombie ideas” – discredited, harmful policies that refuse to die because they serve the powerful. And it offers a clear, actionable plan to drive a stake through their hearts.
The Conscience of a Frustrated Nation
As I see it, the report is a direct assault on the core dysfunctions that plague not just Ghana, but many developing and, let’s be honest, developed economies. The diagnosis is brutal and familiar: an over-mighty executive, a legislature beholden to patronage, a public purse treated as a private piggy bank, and a total failure to plan for the long term. The result is a vicious cycle of borrowing, squandering, and crisis.
What makes this document remarkable is that it doesn’t just nibble around the edges. It goes for the jugular. It’s a blueprint for transforming Ghana from a mere “electoral democracy” – where you get to pick your rulers every few years – to a “developmental democracy,” where the state is actually geared to improve people’s lives. A radical idea, I know.
Reshaping the Imperial Presidency
Contents
The CRC starts at the top, with the Presidency itself. And here’s where it gets interesting. The Committee recommends extending the presidential term from four years to five years, while retaining the two-term limit. The logic, if you think about it, is pretty intuitive: a longer runway gives a President more time to implement policies before the next election cycle begins, reducing the frantic short-termism that plagues governance.
But wait, there’s more. The Committee also recommends lowering the minimum age to be President from 40 to 30 years. This is a significant democratization of access to the highest office – an acknowledgment that competence and vision are not the exclusive preserve of the middle-aged.
And in a move that will make populists choke on their tea, the CRC recommends that the President should pay taxes like everyone else. Currently, the President enjoys tax exemptions on salary, allowances, and facilities. The Committee says: no more. The President shall be subject to tax “on the same terms as every other person.” Novel concept, right?
|
Presidential Reform |
Current Provision |
CRC Recommendation |
|
Term Length |
4 years per term |
5 years per term |
|
Number of Terms |
Maximum 2 terms |
No change (2 terms retained) |
|
Minimum Age |
40 years |
30 years |
|
Tax Exemption |
President exempt from tax |
President pays tax like everyone else |
|
Post-Presidency Immunity |
Broad immunity |
Criminal proceedings allowed within 4 years of leaving office |
Breaking the Patronage Machine: Ministers and Parliament
Now we get to the heart of the matter. One of the most corrosive features of Ghana’s political system – and many others like it – is the fusion of executive and legislative power. Under the current system, the President appoints a majority of ministers from Parliament. This creates a massive patronage machine: MPs are incentivized to be loyal to the President (who can make them ministers) rather than to their constituents or to the principle of legislative oversight. In addition, the country has incredibly deep pool of experienced professionals both in and outside Ghana with years of industry experience to lead any government ministry far better than career MPs.
The CRC’s solution is elegant and radical: no member of Parliament may be appointed a Minister of State or a Deputy Minister or Regional Minister. Full stop. And to close the obvious loophole, an MP who resigns from Parliament shall also be ineligible for appointment as a Minister during the term for which they were elected.
This is not, repeat not, a minor procedural tweak. It’s a fundamental restructuring of the relationship between the executive and the legislature. It breaks the patronage link that turns Parliament into a rubber stamp and restores the possibility of genuine checks and balances.
The Committee also caps the total number of Ministers of State at 57 (including Deputy Ministers and Regional Ministers), with Cabinet Ministers capped at 19. Additionally, the President shall not appoint Deputy Regional Ministers. If the President wants to exceed this ceiling, they must furnish Parliament with specific written reasons and obtain prior parliamentary approval by a simple majority.
Putting the Economy in a Straitjacket (The Good Kind)
So, what about the economic reforms? The report is a treasure trove, but a few stand out for their brilliance. They are, in essence, an attempt to build a robust institutional framework that forces politicians to act responsibly. Think of it as a Ulysses pact for the entire nation, tying its hands to the mast of fiscal sanity to resist the siren song of populist nonsense.
|
Recommendation Category |
The Problem (The Zombie Idea) |
The Solution (The Stake Through the Heart) |
|
National Development Plan |
Governments make wild, uncosted promises, then abandon predecessors’ projects, wasting billions. |
Create a constitutionally binding national development plan. All party manifestos and government budgets must align with it. The NDPC certifies manifesto compliance—technical, not political. No more tearing everything up every four years. |
|
Public Debt Management |
Governments borrow secretly and recklessly, hiding contingent liabilities in SOEs and PPPs until it’s too late. |
Enact a debt management framework with debt anchors or fiscal sustainability rules. Mandate full, public disclosure of all loans, guarantees, and fiscal risks. The central bank is forbidden from printing money for the government without a 60% parliamentary supermajority approval. |
|
State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) |
SOEs are used as slush funds and employment agencies for political cronies, draining public finances. |
Elevate the State Interests and Governance Authority (SIGA) to a constitutional body. Enforce professional, merit-based appointments and transparent governance, protecting SOEs from political capture. |
|
Medium-Term Economic Framework |
Annual budgets are disconnected from any coherent long-term strategy. |
President must present a 3-year medium-term economic framework to Parliament, including GDP growth, inflation, and debt projections. Annual budget must demonstrate alignment. |
Central Bank Independence: No More Printing Press Politics
The recommendations on the Bank of Ghana deserve special attention. Under the proposed amendments, the central bank shall not grant direct advances or credit to the Government unless three conditions are met: (i) the directive is in writing from the Minister of Finance, (ii) it is authorized under an emergency clause in applicable law, and (iii) Parliament approves the request by at least a 60% majority vote.
This is huge. It’s a constitutional firewall against the temptation to monetize deficits – a temptation that has led to inflationary disasters in country after country. The Committee is essentially saying: if you want to print money to cover your spending, you’d better have a genuine emergency and overwhelming parliamentary support. No more quiet deals between the Finance Ministry and the central bank.
Furthermore, the Committee of Parliament responsible for finance shall monitor and report on the Bank of Ghana’s foreign exchange receipts and transfers quarterly, not semi-annually as before. More frequent reporting means more accountability.
Land, Looting, and the People’s Trust
The commission takes on the deeply ingrained problem of resource looting. For decades, public lands in Ghana have been vested in the President, who could, in effect, dispose of them as he saw fit. The CRC proposes to amend the constitution to state that public lands shall be vested in the people of Ghana and held in trust for present and future generations by a reformed Lands Commission with a strict, justiciable fiduciary duty.
What does “fiduciary duty” mean in practice? The Committee spells it out: duties of loyalty to the public interest, transparency, reasoned decision-making, sustainability, intergenerational equity, and prevention of waste, speculative alienation, and abuse. The Lands Commission, in administering public lands as a fiduciary, shall not sell, lease, allocate, or otherwise dispose of any public land except in accordance with procedures that ensure transparency, fairness, value for money, and demonstrable public interest.
And here’s the kicker: breach of these fiduciary duties shall be constitutionally justiciable, with access to judicial remedies including injunctions, nullification of transactions, and accountability sanctions. Citizens can sue the government for mismanaging their land. This transforms land from a source of presidential patronage into a genuine public asset.
The Committee also recommends:
Mandatory annual audits of public land administration by the Auditor-General
Public registers and disclosure of all public land allocations, leases, and disposals
Strengthened parliamentary oversight over public land governance
Accessible remedies for citizens, communities, and civil society to challenge mismanagement
Compulsory Acquisition: No More Land Grabs
The recommendations on compulsory land acquisition (Article 20) are equally robust. The Committee recommends that compulsory acquisition may only be undertaken for a clearly defined, specific, and immediate public purpose, supported by a written statement of necessity demonstrating that acquisition is a measure of last resort and that no reasonably less intrusive alternative is available.
Critically, compulsory acquisition shall not take effect unless funds for full payment of compensation have been assessed, secured, and appropriated in advance. Compensation must be paid within a constitutionally prescribed period, failing which the acquisition shall be void.
And what counts as “fair and adequate compensation”? The Committee clarifies: not only market value, but also compensation for permanent deprivation of land, loss of livelihoods, disruption of economic systems, extinguishment of generational patrimony, and social and cultural dislocation, particularly for customary landholding communities.
The Committee also strengthens reversionary rights: if compulsorily acquired land is not used for the stated public purpose within a defined period, mandatory review and reversionary procedures shall be triggered. Original owners or their successors shall have a legally enforceable right of buy-back at prevailing market value.
A new clause prohibits the acquisition of land not required for immediate public use, to prevent speculative holding of compulsorily acquired land by the State and to guard against abuse of compulsory acquisition for corrupt, political, or private advantage.
The Article 71 Gravy Train: End of the Line
One of the most politically sensitive recommendations concerns Article 71, which governs the emoluments of the President, Vice President, Speaker, Chief Justice, and other high officials. The current system has been widely criticized as a self-serving arrangement where constitutional office holders effectively determine their own pay and benefits, including generous ex-gratia payments.
The CRC recommends that salaries, allowances, facilities, and privileges for these office holders shall be determined by a proposed Independent Public Emoluments Commission. This removes the fox from the henhouse.
The Committee also notes with concern the “widespread practice of cross-service benchmarking of salaries and benefits, including retiring benefits,” which has spread across the public services with “disastrous consequences for the public wage bill.” In particular, a growing number of public employees now “retire on salary”, a privilege historically restricted to the judiciary. The Committee recommends that the Independent Public Emoluments Commission be given a broad mandate to rationalize these distortions.
Public Appointments: A Four-Category Revolution
The Committee proposes a sophisticated classification of public offices into four categories, each with an appropriate mode of appointment designed to balance executive authority with independence and accountability:
|
Category |
Description |
Appointment Mode |
|
Executive Offices |
Ministers, political assistants serving at President’s pleasure |
President has plenary power to select, subject to limited parliamentary approval |
|
Independent Offices |
Electoral Commission, Auditor-General, Chief Justice |
President appoints in accordance with nominations from independent constitutional bodies (reformed Council of State, Judicial Council). President’s role is essentially a duty to appoint as advised. |
|
Hybrid-Independent Offices |
SOE chief executives, other state entities |
President appoints in accordance with the advice of relevant Governing Council after competitive, meritocratic selection |
|
Hybrid-Executive Offices |
Inspector-General of Police, Chief of Defence Staff |
President appoints in consultation with relevant governing council (Police Council, Armed Forces Council) |
This classification effectively binds the President to follow the advice of nominating bodies for independent offices—overturning a Supreme Court decision that held the President was not obliged to follow such advice. It’s a significant curtailment of presidential discretion in favor of institutional independence.
So, Will It Happen?
Of course, here comes the reality check. (You knew it was coming, right?) This report is a blueprint for stripping power and privilege from the very political class that would have to vote these changes into law. It asks them to give up their ability to appoint cronies, to hand out contracts, to borrow without scrutiny, and to treat the state as their personal property.
Will they do it? The history of political economy suggests that entrenched elites don’t give up power willingly. The forces of the status quo – the beneficiaries of the zombie ideas – are powerful. They will argue that these changes are too radical, too restrictive, that they undermine national sovereignty (by which they mean their sovereignty over the public purse).
But for the first time in a long time, there is a clear, coherent, and intellectually rigorous alternative on the table. The CRC has given the people of Ghana a powerful weapon. They’ve laid bare the mechanics of misrule and provided a detailed, credible path to a better future. The fight to implement these reforms will be a test of whether Ghana, and perhaps other nations watching, can finally break free from the zombies and build an economy that works for everyone, not just the few.
These are the moments when George Washingtons, Churchill, Kruschev, Lee Kuan Yew, and many a great leaders are birth in the life of a nation. I pray my brother John D. Mahama will not step back from the call of history and the whispers of the gods, to do for this nation what many have already given him the mandate for. He, has one life to live.
Summary of Key Recommendations:
|
Area |
Key Recommendation |
|
Presidential Term |
Extend from 4 to 5 years; retain 2-term limit |
|
Presidential Age |
Lower minimum from 40 to 30 years |
|
Presidential Tax |
President to pay taxes like all citizens |
|
Ministers from Parliament |
No MP may be appointed Minister; separation of executive and legislature |
|
Number of Ministers |
Cap at 57 total (19 Cabinet + Deputies/Regional); no Deputy Regional Ministers |
|
National Development Plan |
Constitutionally binding; manifestos must align; NDPC certifies compliance |
|
Debt Management |
Debt anchors/ceilings; full disclosure of all liabilities; 60% supermajority for central bank advances to government |
|
Central Bank |
Quarterly (not semi-annual) reporting; restrictions on government financing |
|
Public Lands |
Vest in the people, not the President; Lands Commission as fiduciary; justiciable duties |
|
Compulsory Acquisition |
Strict public purpose; full compensation before acquisition; reversionary rights strengthened |
|
SOE Governance |
SIGA as constitutional body; merit-based appointments; protection from political capture |
|
Article 71 Emoluments |
Independent Public Emoluments Commission to determine pay; end “retire on salary” spread |
|
Public Appointments |
Four-category system; President bound to follow advice for independent offices |